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Rogers: Rogers: Federal Pre-Emption

Notes
Federal Pre-emption of State Railroad
Tort Law: The Misuse of the Federal
Railroad Safety Act to Insulate

Railroads from Liability
I. INTRODUCTION

In Walker v. St. Louis-Southwestern Railway,' the Missouri Court of
Appeals, Eastern District, faced the issue of whether the Federal Railroad
Safety Act (FRSA)2 pre-empted state tort law. This was an issue of first
impression in the Eastern District of Missouri The FRSA was enacted in
1970, but courts have only recently started considering its pre-emptive effect.4
The courts have produced widely conflicting results in attempting to discern
which state laws Congress meant to pre-empt, and which Congress intended
not to affect.' Most of these courts have held pre-emption exists when it was
arguable whether pre-emption was intended. This is especially true in regard

1. 835 S.W.2d 469 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).
2. 45 U.S.C. §§ 421-425 (1988).
3. Walker, 835 S.W.2d at 471.
4. Id.
5. See CSX Transp., Inc. v Easterwood, 113 S. Ct. 1732, 1743-44 (1993) (federal
regulations enacted pursuant to FRSA pre-empt state law excessive speed claims, but
do not pre-empt claims regarding grade-crossing warning devices); Hatfield v.
Burlington N. R.R., 958 F.2d 320, 324 (10th Cir. 1992), petitionfor cert. filed, 60
U.S.L.W. 3860 (June 8, 1992) (No. 91-1977) (state law is pre-empted even if there
had been no determination as to what specific warning device should be required for
the grade crossing in question); Karl v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 880 F.2d 68, 76 (8th
Cir. 1989) (FRSA was not intended to pre-empt state tort law); Marshall v. Burlington
N., Inc., 720 F.2d 1149, 1154 (9th Cir. 1983) (no pre-emption of state tort law until
a local agency makes a determination regarding the type of warning device to be
installed at the grade crossing in question); see also Easterwood v. CSX Tramp., Inc.,
933 F.2d 1548, 1553 (11th Cir. 1991), aff'd, 113 S. Ct. 1732 (1993); Missouri Pac.
R.R. v. R.R. Comm'n of Tex., 948 F.2d 179, 183 (5th Cir. 1991); Norfolk & W. Ry.
v. Public Utils. Comm'n of Ohio, 926 F.2d 567, 569-71 (6th Cir. 1991); CSXTransp.,
Inc. v. Public Utils. Comm'n of Ohio, 901 F.2d 497, 501-02 (6th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 781 (1991); Burlington N. R.R. v. Minnesota, 882 F.2d 1349, 1353
(8th Cir. 1989); Burlington N. R.R. v. Montana, 880 F.2d. 1104, 1105 (9th Cir. 1989);
Florida E. Coast Ry. v. Griffin, 566 So. 2d 1321, 1324 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
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to two issues: train speed and grade crossing warning devices. Both issues
were present in Walker. ,
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
On February 28, 1986, the decedent, Randy S. Walker, drove his 1976
Chevrolet Nova onto Randall's Railroad Crossing in Scott County, Missouri.6
Randall's Crossing consists of two tracks.7 The main-line track is on the east
side and a siding track is on the west.' Both tracks curve west at the
crossing.9 At approximately 7:30 p.m. Walker approached the crossing from
the east.10 The crossing was obstructed by a slow-moving train on the siding
track." Walker drove his car up to the crossing and stopped on the main
line track. 2 As Walker waited for the train to clear the crossing, witnesses
watched him move his car back and forth ten to twenty feet, rolling the car
on and off the main-line track numerous times.13
After several minutes the witnesses observed Walker and the passenger
step out of the car, urinate on the tracks and return to the car. 4 Once
Walker and the passenger were inside the car, it remained stationary on the
main-line track.' 5 After several more minutes a southbound train approached
the crossing on the main-line track. 6 Due to the curvature of the track, the
slower train on the siding track obstructed the view of both Walker and the
approaching train on the main-line, making it impossible for either to see the
other until the train was only 800 feet from Walker's car. 7 Once the car
was in view, the engineer applied the emergency brakes and sounded the
train's hom but was unable to stop the train before it struck Walker's car,
killing him and the passenger."8
Appellants, the surviving spouse and the minor child of the decedent
Walker, filed a petition for wrongful death in the Circuit Court of the City of

6. Walker, 835 S.W.2d at 470.
7. Id
8. Id at 470-71.
9. Id at 471.
10. Id at 470-71.
11. Id at 471.
12. Id
13. Id
14. Id
15. Id
16. Id
17. Id
18. Id
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol58/iss2/3
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St. Louis. 9 Respondent, St. Louis-Southwestern Railway Company, filed a
motion for summary judgment ° claiming that its common law duty to
maintain a good and safe crossing had been pre-empted by the FRSA. 2' St.

Louis-Southwestern Railway Company claimed the FRSA pre-empted state
tort law because the Secretary of Transportation, through the Missouri
Department of Transportation (MDOT), had approved the adequacy of the
warning devices at the crossing; therefore, the federal standard pre-empted
state tort law = On January 29, 1991, the trial court heard and sustained
respondent's motion for summary judgment.'
Appellants appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of
respondent to the Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District.U The Eastern
District affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of respondents.'
Applying a contingent pre-emption analysis, the Eastern District held that
when the MDOT, pursuant to the FRSA, makes a determination regarding
required crossing protection at a railroad crossing, all further common law
duty for the railroad to provide crossing protection is pre-empted by the
federal regulations determined by the local agency (MDOT).26 Once the
court determined that the federal standard pre-empted state tort law and that
the railroad had complied with the regulations promulgated by the MDOT, the
railroad had no further duty to maintain a safe crossing.27
1I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. FederalPre-emption of State Law
The theory of federal pre-emption finds its authority in the Supremacy
Clause of Article VI of the United States Constitution.' Article VI states
that the Constitution and the laws enacted by Congress pursuant to it shall be
the "supreme Law of the Land... any [t]hing in the Constitution or Laws of
any State to the [c]ontrary notwithstanding." 9 The pivotal question in preemption cases is whether Congress intended to prohibit the challenged state

19. Id
20. Id
21. Id; see also 45 U.S.C. §§ 421-445 (1988).

22. Walker, 835 S.W.2d at 472.
23. Id at 471.
24. Id
25. Id at 474.

26. Id at 473-74.
27. Id at 474.

28. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
29. Id
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1993
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or local law at the time of enactment. If such intent is found, the state law
is pre-empted. Congressional intent to pre-empt may be expressly stated in
the statute or implicit in its structure and purpose.3
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that state law is preempted under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution in three circumstances. 2 First, Congress can enact a statute that pre-empts state law by its
express terms.33 Second, courts will find pre-emption when Congress has
indicated that the federal government will exclusively occupy a field of
regulation.34 The Court in English v. General Electric Co.3" stated that
congressional intent can be implied when the statutes and regulations are so
pervasive that there is no room left for state regulation or when there are
strong federal interests in exclusive regulation of the field.36 However,
congressional intent must be "clear and manifest" if the allegedly pre-empted
field includes areas of traditional state interest.37 Third, state law is preempted to the extent that it actually "conflicts with federal law."38 State law
conflicts with federal law when compliance with both state and federal law is
impossible or when the state law impedes a federal purpose.39
Congressional action is not always necessary for a court to infer preemption. In certain circumstances, inaction, when Congress finds regulation
inappropriate, is enough for a court to imply pre-emption. This type of preemption is referred to as "negative pre-emption."4 For a court to find
negative pre-emption it must determine that Congress considered, but did not
enact, detailed regulations in a specific area.4 The United States Supreme

30. Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504 (1978). "The purpose of
Congress is the ultimate touchstone." Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v. Schermerhom, 375
U.S. 96, 103 (1963).
31. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977).
32. English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78-79 (1990).
33. Id.
34. Id at 79.
35. 496 U.S. 72 (1990).
36. Id at 78-79.
37. Id. (quoting Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977)).
38. English, 496 U.S. at 79.
39. Id.
40. See Northfolk & W. Ry. v. Public Utils. Comm'n of Ohio, 926 F.2d 567, 570
(6th Cir. 1991); Walker v. St. Louis S.W. Ry., 835 S.W.2d 469, 473 (Mo. Ct. App.
1992).
41. Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Railroad Comm'n. of Tex., 833 F.2d 570, 575-76 (5th
Cir. 1987). This court found pre-emption was not intended concerning walkway
regulations using the standard announced in Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S.
151 (1978). For a discussion of the Ray standard, see infra text accompanying note
43.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol58/iss2/3
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Court held in Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co.:42 "[W]here the failure of...
federal officials to affirmatively exercise their full authority takes on the
character of a ruling that no such regulation is appropriate or approved
pursuant to the policy of the statute, States are not permitted to use their
police power to enact such a regulation."4'
When the pre-empted field is a traditional state interest, there must be a
finding of a "clear and manifest" intent by Congress to pre-empt before a
court may infer pre-emption.m A state's tort law satisfies this "traditional
state interest" requirement.
The intent does not have to be found in a specific congressional act. The
Supreme Court stated in Louisiana Public Service Commission v. FCC:
"Pre-emption may result not only from action taken by Congress itself; a
federal agency acting within the scope of its congressionally delegated
When the requisite intent is
authority may pre-empt state regulation."'
found, however, and a state tort law theory of recovery is determined to be
by federal law, evidence relating to that theory is inadmissible at
pre-empted
47
trial.
There is a strong presumption against the defense of pre-emption. 48 The
party seeking to establish that federal law pre-empts state law has the burden
of proving pre-emption was intended by Congress at the time of enactment.49
The doctrine of federal pre-emption should not be utilized without clear
evidence that pre-emption was the intent of Congress."0 The presumption
against pre-emption is even stronger when traditional state interests such as

42. 435 U.S. 151 (1978).
43. Id at 178 (1978) (quoting Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor
Relations Bd., 330 U.S. 767, 774 (1974)).
44. See English, 496 U.S. at 78 (1990); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S.
218, 230 (1947).
45. 476 U.S. 355 (1986).

46. Id at 369.
47. Mahony v. CSX Transp., Inc., 966 F.2d 644, 645 (11th Cir.), reh'ggranted,
980 F.2d 1379 (11th Cir. 1992). If a railroad does not comply with the FRSA, then
a state tort remedy is available. See id.
48. CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 113 S. Ct. 1732, 1739 (1993). The Court
stated: "In the interest of avoiding unintended encroachment on the authority of the
States, however, a court interpreting a federal statute pertaining to a subject

traditionally governed by state law will be reluctant to find pre-emption. Thus, preemption will not lie unless it is the clear and manifest purpose of Congress."' Id at
1737 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
49. Malone v. White Motor'Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504 (1978).

50. Id.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1993
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are at issue and the federal law provides for no compensation
tort recovery
5
system. 1
B. The FederalRailroadSafety Act
The FRSA is the primary source of legislation dealing with the various
railroad safety problems.5 2 The declaration of the purpose of the FRSA
states: "The Congress declares that the purpose of this chapter is to promote
safety in all areas of railroad operations and to reduce railroad-related
accidents.. ."5' Congress not only adopted the Act to "promote safety in
all areas of railroad operations,"' but also to provide nationally uniform
safety regulations.55
The FRSA confers upon the Secretary of Transportation authority to
prescribe "rules, regulations, orders, and standards for all areas of railroad
safety supplementing provisions of law and regulations in effect on October
16, 1970."156 This authority, however, has been delegated by the Secretary
to the Federal Railroad Authority (FRA)." The Act requires that the
regulatory authority study and develop solutions to problems associated with
railroad grade crossings.5" The FRA has delegated federal authority to
regulate grade crossings to local agencies.5 '

51. English, 496 U.S. at 79. Note that neither the FRSA, nor the regulations
enacted under it, provide for a method to compensate people injured in railroad
accidents. See 45 U.S.C. §§ 421-445 (1988); infra notes 141-47 and accompanying
text.
52. See generally 45 U.S.C. §§ 421-445 (1988).
53. Id § 421.
54. Id
55. Id § 434.,
56. Id § 431(a).
57. 49 C.F.R. § 1.49(m) (1989).
58. 45 U.S.C. § 433 (1988). In 1971, the Secretary reported to Congress on the
problems associated with grade crossings. See U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., RAILROADHIGHWAY SAFETY, PART I: A COMPREHENsIVE STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM (1971).
In 1972, the Secretary recommended solutions to the problems with grade crossings
addressed in the 1971 report. See U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., RAILROAD-HIGHWAY
SAFETY, PART II: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR RESOLVING THE PROBLEM (1972); infra
note 158.
59. Hatfield v. Burlington N. R.R., 958 F.2d 320, 322 (10th Cir. 1992), petition
for cert.filed, 60 U.S.L.W. 3860 (June 8, 1992) (No. 91-1977).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol58/iss2/3
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The intent of Congress to pre-empt state laws and regulations governing
railroad safety can be found in the language of Section 434 of the FRSA,
which declares that
laws, rules, regulations, orders, and standards relating to railroad
safety shall be nationally uniform to the extent practicable. A
State may adopt or continue in force any law, rule, regulation,
order, or standard relating to railroad safety until such time as
the Secretary [of Transportation] has adopted a rule, regulation,
order, or standard relating to railroad safety when necessary to
eliminate or reduce an essentially local safety hazard, and when
not incompatible with any Federal law, rule, regulation, order,
or standard,6 and when not creating an undue burden on interstate
commerce.

0

The legislative history also indicates Congress' intent to pre-empt because
it indicates Congress was concerned with a state's role in railroad safety.6'
The House report stated that "[t]he committee does not believe that safety in
the Nation's railroads would be advanced sufficiently by subjecting the
national rail system to a variety of enforcement in 50 different judicial and
administrative systems."'62 The committee further stated that "where the

federal government has authority, with respect to rail safety, it preempts the
field."'63 The task force recognized the problems inherent in a wide variety
of conflicting state safety regulations and concluded that "railroad safety...
requires a more comprehensive national approach.""
The task force
recommended that a set of "uniform procedures and standards" needed to be
enacted to regulate rail safety.65
Even though Section 434 of the FRSA seems to state an express preemption of state law, Congress did not intend the FRSA to cover the entire
field of railroad safety."6 Section 434 cites two exceptions that permit state
regulation of railroad safety. First, "preemption does not occur until the
Secretary adopts a rule, regulation, or standard covering the subject matter of

60. 45 U.S.C. § 434 (1988). In CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Easterwood, 113 S.
Ct. 1732, 1737 (1993), the Supreme Court stated that the "[liegal duties imposed on
railroads by the common law fall within the scope of these broad phrases."
61. See generally H. REP. No. 1194, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprintedin
1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4104.
62. Id at 4109.
63. Id at 4108.
64. Id. at 4127.
65. Id at 4130.
66. Marshall v. Burlington N., Inc., 720 F.2d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 1983).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1993
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the state law."'67 A state regulation applies to the same subject
matter as an
6
FRA regulation if it "addresses the same safety concerns."
Secondly, Section 434 of the FRSA recognizes situations in which a state
can adopt its own regulation even when the Secretary of Transportation has
issued a "rule, regulation or standard covering the same subject matter" as the
state law.' The state law or regulation covering the same subject matter still
controls so long as it (1) is "necessary to eliminate or reduce an essentially
local safety hazard," (2) is "not incompatible with any Federal law, rule,
regulation, order, or standard" and (3) does not create an "undue burden on
interstate commerce."7
The legislative history makes it clear that this exception for "local safety
hazards" is to be narrowly construed. 7 The House Report states:
The purpose of this ...provision is to enable the States to
respond to local situations not capable of being adequately
encompassed within uniform national standards. The States will
retain authority to regulate individual local problems where
necessary to eliminate or reduce essentially local railroad safety
hazards. Since these local hazardi would not be statewide in
character, there is no intent to permit a State to establish
Statewide standards superimposed on national standards covering
the same subject matter.72
Several deductions can be made from the FRSA and its legislative
history. First, the history of the FRSA makes it clear that Congress was
concerned with the problems created by various and conflicting state
regulations.' Second, the legislative history of the FRSA explicitly states
that it intends to pre-empt all state regulations covering the same subject
matter as the federal regulations, unless the regulation meets the local safety

67. Hatfield v. Burlington N. R.R., 958 F.2d 320, 321 (10th Cir. 1992), petition
for cert.filed, 60 U.S.L.W. 3860 (June 8, 1992) (No. 91-1977).
68. Burlington N. R.R. v. Montana, 880 F.2d. 1104, 1105 (9th Cir. 1989);
Burlington N. R.R. v. Minnesota, 882 F.2d 1349, 1353 (8th Cir. 1989).
69. 45 U.S.C. § 434 (1988).
70. Id
71. See H. REP. No. 1194, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted in 1970

U.S.C.C.A.N. 4104, 4117.
72. Id Missouri Pacific Railroad v. Railroad Commission of Texas, 948 F.2d
179, 183 (5th Cir. 1991), was in accord with the legislative history when it held that
regulations having statewide application cannot be justified as addressing a "local
safety hazard."
73. *See H. REP. No. 1194, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted in 1970
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4104, 4109.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol58/iss2/3
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hazard exception.74 The converse is also true: if there is no federal
regulation covering the same subject matter as the state regulation, the state
regulation is not pre-empted." Third, one of the goals of the FRSA was to
make the "standards relating to railroad safety... nationally uniform to the
extent practicable."7 6
It appears that Congress contemplated a "contingent pre-emption" analysis
when it enacted the FRSA.77 Thus, pre-emption is contingent on whether
there is a federal regulation or standard covering the same subject matter as
the state regulation.78 Therefore, the initial inquiry is to determine if any
federal regulations have been promulgated that cover the conduct at issue. If
there is a federal law or regulation covering the subject matter, then preemption will be found.79 If there is no federal regulation governing the
particular matter at issue, most state and federal courts have recognized that
state common law doctrines apply.80
In CSX Transportation,Inc. v. Easterwood,'the Supreme Court applied
a contingent pre-emption analysis to determine whether Georgia negligence
law regarding the adequacy of the warning devices at a grade crossing and
train speed were pre-empted by federal regulations." The Court focused on
the use of the word "covering" in Section 434 to determine that Congress only
intended pre-emption to occur if the federal regulations "substantially
subsume" the state law. To further support the Court's narrow pre-emption
reading of Section 434 it pointed out that the "term 'covering' is ...
employed within a provision that displays considerable solicitude for state law
clause is both prefaced and succeeded by
in that its express pre-emption
83
express saving clauses.,

74. Id at 4108.
75. 45 U.S.C. § 434 (1988).
76. Id.
77. See Marshall v. Burlington N., Inc., 720 F.2d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 1983).
78. -See H. REP. No. 1194, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted in 1970
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4104, 4108.

79. Id
80. See generally Easterwood v. CSX Transp., Inc., 933 F.2d 1548 (11th Cir.
1991), affd, 113 S. Ct. 1732 (1993); Karl v. Burlington N. R.R., 880 F.2d 68 (8th Cir.
1989); Marshall v. Burlington N., Inc., 720 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir. 1983); Florida E.
Coast Ry. v. Griffin, 566 So. 2d 1321 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990).

81. CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 113 S. Ct. 1732, 1738 (1993).
82. Id. The Court stated: "To prevail on the claim that the regulations have preemptive effect, petitioner must establish more than that they 'touch upon' or 'relate to'
that subject matter... for 'covering' is a more restrictive term which indicates that
pre-emption will lie only if the federal regulations substantially subsume the subject
matter of the relevant state law." Id
83. Id
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1993
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Even though the FRSA and its implementation seem relatively clear,
courts have produced a wide variety of conflicting results."' The diverse
outcomes are largely due to the fact that some courts have given a very broad
pre-emption reading to the federal regulations, 5 while other courts have
given the regulations a very narrow reading. 6 For example, in a grade
crossing case, Hapfeld v. Burlington Northern RailroadCo.,87 the court gave
the broadest pre-emption reading yet to the FRSA.88 In Hayfeld, the court
held thatthe FRSA pre-empted state regulation of railroad grade crossings
although a local agency never visited the crossing to determine what type of
warning devices were needed. 9 The court found it sufficient that the
Secretary adopted the Manual of Uniform Traffic Control Devices on Streets
and Highways (MUTCD), which contained standards for grade crossings."
The court reasoned that since the Secretary had adopted grade crossing
regulations in the MUTCD, all "state law relating to grade crossing safety
devices was then superseded."9 Once the court found pre-emption it stated,
"the Secretary has absolved railroads from complying with duties imposed by
state law regarding safety devices at grade crossings."'

84. See Hatfield v. Burlington N. R.R., 958 F.2d 320,324 (10th Cir. 1992) (state
law is pre-empted even if local regulating agency had not determined what specific
warning device should be required for the grade crossing in question),petitionforcert.
filed, 60 U.S.L.W. 3860 (June 8, 1992) (No. 91-1977); Karl, 880 F.2d at 75 (FRSA
was not intended to pre-empt state tort law); Marshall, 720 F.2d at 1154 (no preemption of state tort law until local agency makes a determination regarding the type
of warning device to be installed at the grade crossing in question).
85. Hatfield v. Burlington Northern Railroad Co., 958 F.2d 320 (10th Cir. 1992),
petitionfor cert.filed, 60 U.S.L.W. 3860 (June 8, 1992) (No. 91-1977), is illustrative.
86. Mahony v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 966 F.2d 644 (11th Cir. 1992), reh'g
granted,980 F.2d 1379 (11th Cir. 1992), and Griffin, 566 So. 2d 1321, both give a
narrow pre-emption reading to the FRSA.
87. 958 F.2d 320 (10th Cir. 1992), petitionfor cert. filed, 60 U.S.L.W. 3860
(June 8, 1992) (No. 91-1977).
88. Id at 324.
89. Id
90. Id,at 323. The MUTCD has been incorporated into federal regulations
promulgated by the Secretary. See 23 C.F.R §§ 655.601-.603 (1992).
91. Hatfield,958 F.2d at 324.
92. Id The Supreme Court rejected the HaOleldanalysis in CSX Transportation,
Inc. v. Easterwood, 113 S.Ct. 1732, 1740 (1993). The Court stated, "Petitioner's
argument suffers from an initial implausibility: it asserts that established state
negligence law has been implicitly displaced by means of an elliptical reference in a
Government manual otherwise devoted to describing for the benefit of state employees
the proper size, color and shape of traffic signs and signals." Id. The Court
concluded, "the MUTCD provides a description of, rather than a prescription for, the
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol58/iss2/3
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In contrast, the court in Marshall v. Burlington Northern, Inc.' held

that state law was not pre-empted until a local agency made a specific
determination regarding the type of warning device to be installed at the grade
crossing in question.' In the same vein, but with an even narrower preemption reading, is Mahony v. CSX Transportation,Inc.95 In Mahony, the

court noted that the federal government was minimally involved in regulating
the construction of safer railroad grade crossings, but held that state tort law
was not pre-empted because the federal "involvement was not so substantial
or specific" as to pre-empt state tort suits based on the railroad's failure to
maintain a safe crossing.'
Almost all courts that have faced the issue of whether the FRSA preempts local speed regulations have found pre-emption.' These courts have
pointed to federal railroad speed limits enacted pursuant to the FRSA to justify
their position.98 Not all courts, however, will ignore a railroad's negligent
conduct regarding a failure to reduce train speed below the maximum speed
limit established by federal regulations. In Florida East Coast Railway v.
Griffin," the court rejected the argument that the federal speed regulations
excluded all evidence of a railroad's negligent conduct regarding train
speed."® The court concluded, "Certainly it was not the intent of the act to
insulate railroads from liability for specific tortious acts in the face of
hazardous conditions."''

allocation of responsibility for grade crossing safety." Id
93. 720 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir. 1983).
94. Id at 1154.

95. 966 F.2d 644 (11th Cir.), reh'ggranted,980 F.2d 1379 (11th Cir. 1992).
96. Id at 645.
97. CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 113 S. Ct. 1732, 1743-44 (1993); Mahony,

966 F.2d at 645; Burlington N. R.. Co. v. Minnesota, 882 F.2d 1349, 1353 (8th Cir.

1989); Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Montana, 880 F.2d 1104, 1105 (9th Cir. 1989). See
infra part V.B for a criticism of these holdings.
98. 49 C.F.R. § 213.9 (1989). In Easterwood,the Supreme Court employed not
only § 213.9(a), but other related safety regulations adopted by the Secretary, to
conclude that a common-law negligence action for excessive speed was pre-empted.
Easterwood, 113 S. Ct. 1732, 1742-43. For a discussion about why the Court's
holding should have narrow application, see infra note 139.
99. 566 So. 2d 1321 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
100. Id at 1324.
101. Id
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THE INSTANT DECISION

In the instant case, the appellants alleged five claims of negligence: (1)
the railroad crossing at issue was an extra-hazardous or ultra-hazardous
crossing, and the warning devices at the crossing were inadequate; (2) the

warning devices at the crossing were not adequately and properly maintained;
(3) respondent's train was not operating at a speed commensurate with the
extra-hazardous nature of the crossing; (4) the crossing was too narrow; and
(5) the crossing itself was not properly and adequately maintained."° The
court stated that federal pre-emption was at issue in the first, third, and fourth
claims. 3 The court found that the second and fifth claims had no factual
merit."°
The court recognized that there is a presumption against pre-emption,0'
but found that "rejection of Federal preemption in this area of the law avoids
the clear reality of the situation."'" Of the possible approaches to the preemption issue, the court found the contingent pre-emption rule of Marshallv.
Burlington Northern, Inc.,

7

to be the most persuasive." 8

The court in Marshall determined that the Secretary of Transportation
had delegated federal authority to regulate grade crossings." The Marshall
court reasoned that when a federal decision is reached regarding the adequacy
of crossing warning devices through a local agency, the railroad's duty to
maintain a good and safe crossing is pre-empted by the local agency's
decisiohn." If no determination has been made regarding the adequacy of
the crossing's warning devices, the FRSA does not cover the warning devices
at these crossings, and th6 pre-emption doctrine does not apply."'
Applying the Marshallcourt's contingent pre-emption analysis, the court
held that appellants' first claim had been pre-empted by federal law and failed
to state a cause of action upon which relief could be granted." 2 The court
specifically noted that officials from both the Missouri Division of Transportation and Cape Girardeau County, as well as railroad officials, went to

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Walker, 835 S.W.2d at 471.
Id
Id at 474.
Id at 472.
Id at 473.
720 F.2d 1149, 1154 (9th Cir. 1983).
Walker, 835 S.W.2d at 473.
Marshall,720 F.2d at 1154.

110. Id.
111. Id
112. Walker, 835 S.W.2d at 474. The plaintiffs' first claim was that the crossing

was extra-hazardous and the warning devices were inadequate. Id.
at 471.
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Randall's Crossing to conduct a safety survey of the grade crossing."' The
MDOT and the Transportation Commission determined that no other warning
devices needed to be installed at the crossing in addition to the existing
railroad cross bucks."' The court found this regulation scheme was what
Congress contemplated when it enactedthe FRSA and, therefore, the railroad's
common law duty to maintain a good and safe railroad crossing was preempted by federal law under the contingent pre-emption analysis announced
in Marshall."'
Next the court addressed appellants' claim that the warning devices at the
crossing were not adequately and properly maintained." 6 To support their
claim, appellants asserted that the railroad crossing sign was rusted and
deteriorated." 7 The court stated that the purpose of a cross buck sign is to
warn traffic of a railroad crossing."' Noting that at the time of Walker's
approach there was a slow moving train on the siding track blocking
decedent's path, the court held that there was no doubt that the decedent knew
of the crossing and was adequately warned of its existence." 9 To support
its holding, the court cited Rowe v. Henwood,n ° which held that the
presence of a train on a track is normally a sufficient warning of a railroad
crossing.'
The court said in the face of this precedent, the appellants'
assertion that the cross buck sign was rusted and deteriorated was "utterly

meaningless.""
The court also found no merit in appellants' claim that the crossing was
not properly and adequately maintained." To support this claim appellants
cited the fact that the crossing was filled with ruts and potholes. 4 The
court stated that the only reason potholes might become important is if they
impeded Walker's movement in some way, making his escape difficult or
impossible."z The court said that the potholes did not affect the mobility

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id at 473.
Id at 473-74.
Id at 474.
Id
Id
Id
Id
207 S.W.2d 829 (Mo. Ct. App. 1948).
Id at 833.
Walker, 835 S.W.2d at 474.
Id
Id
Id
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of Walker's car, citing the fact that he moved his car back and forth about ten
to twenty feet several times when he arrived at the crossing.' 6
The next issue the court addressed was appellants' third claim that the
train was traveling at a speed that was not commensurate with the extrahazardous nature of the crossing.'27 The court noted that train speed is the
subject of extensive federal regulation.' 8 Applying the contingent preemption analysis in Marshall, the court held that this claim was pre-empted
by the federal regulation. 9 Because this issue was pre-empted by the
federal regulation, the railroad was under no duty to moderate the speed of its
trains below the maximum speed allowed in the federal regulations. 3
Finally, the court addressed the appellants' fourth claim that the crossing
was too narrow. 3 ' The court could not figure out how the width of the
crossing could affect any safety concerns, but held the issue was likewise preempted by federal regulations."' The court did not conduct any analysis of
this issue, nor did it point to the federal regulation that pre-empted this
claim.' 3
V. COMMENT
A. Federal Pre-emption of Railroad Tort Law
The rationale for finding state tort law pre-empted by the FRSA is sound.
There is little doubt that uniformity of railroad safety regulations to the extent
practicablewas needed. It was virtually impossible for a railroad to know and
conform with all the diverse safety regulations in every jurisdiction across the
country. To force a railroad to comply with varying and conflicting
regulations would be unnecessarily burdensome
and unfair to a railroad. For
34

these reasons, the FRSA was enacted.1

While the FRSA was intended to insulate the railroads from state tort
liability to a' certain extent, Congress did not intend to totally protect railroads
from state tort actions if the railroad acted negligently, even though it
complied with the federal regulations.1 35 A court, by finding pre-emption

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id
Id
Id (citing 49 C.F.R. § 213.9 (1991)).
Id
Id
Id.
Id
Id
See supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
See 45 U.S.C. § 434 (1988).
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in the face of negligent conduct, ignores its responsibility to the general
public. A railroad must keep rail travel safe; if it does not, a court should
supply a system of compensation for people harmed by the negligent acts of
another.
Congress recognized that national uniformity of railroad regulations was
not possible, or desirable, under all circumstances.'36 Likewise, the FRA, in
the preface to the speed regulations enacted pursuant to the FRSA, recognized
that specific local conditions would require remedial regulations to provide for
safe railroad operation.'37 Courts must recognize what Congress and the
FRA specifically noted in their regulations before finding federal pre-emption
of state law. Thus, courts should not find pre-emption when local conditions
and circumstances of an accident suggest the railroad was negligent.
Courts have been zealous in recent years in finding that the FRSA preempts' state tort law. 3 1 In their efforts to insulate railroads from tort
liability, the courts have failed to realize that some federal regulations are

136. See id.
137. 49 C.F.R. § 213.1 (1991). A similar disclaimer is contained in the MUTCD:
"It is the intent that the provisions of this Manual be standards for traffic control
devices installation, but not a legal requirement for installation." CSX Transp., Inc.
v. Easterwood, 113 S. Ct. 1732, 1740 (1993) (quoting MUTCD at 1A-4). The U.S.

Department of Transportation also disavows any claim to pre-empt state regulation of
railroad grade crossings. "Jurisdiction over railroad-highway crossings resides almost

exclusively in the States. Within some States, responsibility is frequently divided
among several public agencies and the railroad." Id at 1740 (quoting U.S
TRANSP., FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION, TRAFFIC CONTROL
HANDBOOK 8A-6 (1983)).
138. See Easterwood, 113 S. Ct. 1732, 1743-44 (pre-emption of
excessive speed claim); Hatfield v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 958 F.2d 320,

DEP'T OF
DEVICES

state law
324 (10th

Cir. 1992) (pre-emption regarding safety devices at grade crossing); Mahony v. CSX
Transp., Inc., 966 F.2d 644, 645 (11th Cir. 1992), reh'ggranted,980 F.2d 1379 (1lth
Cir. 1992) (FRSA pre-empted issue of train speed); Easterwood v. CSX Transp., Inc.,
933 F.2d 1548, 1553-55 (11th Cir. 1991), aff'd, 113 S. Ct. 1732 (1993) (pre-emption
regarding train speed and railbed vegetation); Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Railroad Comm'n
of Tex., 948 F.2d 179, 184 (5th Cir. 1991) (FRSA pre-empted state walkway
regulation); Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n of Ohio, 926 F.2d 567,
571 (6th Cir. 1991) (FRSA regulations pre-empted state regulations requiring railroad
bridge walkways); CSX Transp., Inc., v. Public Utils. Comm'n of Ohio, 901 F.2d 497,
501 (6th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 781 (1991) (FRSA pre-empted state
regulations purporting to cover transportation of hazardous materials); Burlington N.
R.R. Co. v. Minnesota, 882 F.2d 1349, 1353 (8th Cir. 1989) (FRSA pre-empted power
brake and rear-end marking device regulations); Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Montana,
880 F.2d 1104, 1106 (9th Cir. 1989) (FRSA pre-empted caboose regulations); Marshall
v. Burlington N., Inc., 720 F.2d 1149, 1151 (9th Cir. 1983) (pre-emption regarding
proper warning equipment to be used on locomotives).
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liability, the courts have failed to realize that some federal regulations are
particularly well suited to pre-empt state law, while others are not. For
example, regulations concerning what type of lights or horns are needed on
trains are perfect candidates for pre-emption. To require a train to have
oscillating strobe lights in one jurisdiction but flashing lights in another would
be unreasonable. Likewise, if some jurisdictions were allowed to require an
engineer in the caboose, while others were not, the regulation would be
unnecessarily burdensome. To require a railroad to comply with divergent
regulations such as these would ignore the reality that trains are used for
interstate commerce and travel through many jurisdictions.
In contrast to such regulations are safety regulations that are dependent
on local conditions and circumstances. Train speed and grade crossing
warning devices are examples of regulations dependent on local conditions and
circumstances. The fact that almost all courts have found federal pre-emption
of local speed regulations is especially troubling. 3 9 Just as troubling are
courts such as Hafeld which find federal pre-emption of grade crossing
warning devices when no local agency has made a determination of required
warning devices at a specific crossing. 40

In general, the issue of federal pre-emption of state tort law should be
approached in a cautious manner by the courts. The purpose of the FRSA is
to promote railroad safety,' not to abolish state tort law without providing
a new system of liability and compensation. Because there is no comprehensive federal system to redress parties injured in train accidents, it is arguable
that the FRSA permits the states to continue imposing liability in tort.'

139. See Easterwood,113 S. Ct. 1732, 1743-44 (1993); Mahony, 966 F.2d at 645
(11th Cir. 1992); Easterwood, 933 F.2d at 1553 (11th Cir. 1991), aff'd, 113 S. Ct.
1732 (1993); Burlington N. R.R. v. Montana, 880 F.2d. at 1105; Burlington N. R.R.
v. Minnesota, 882 F.2d at 1353. It should be noted that the Supreme Court's holding
in Easterwoodcan be read narrowly in regard to train speed pre-emption. The Court
limited its holding to pre-emption of common-law negligence claims for excessive
speed and declined to address the related state law claims for violation of a statutory
speed limit or the duty to slow or stop a train to avoid a specific hazard. Easterwood,
113 S. Ct. at 1743 n.15.
140. Ha(lield,958 F.2d at 324. The Supreme Court effectively overruled Hatfield
in regard to pre-emption of grade crossing warning devices in Easterwood. See
Easterwood, 113 S. Ct. at 1740. Reasons why pre-emption of train speed and gradecrossing warning devices should be approached cautiously are discussed infra parts
V.B and V.C, respectively.
141. 45 U.S.C. § 421 (1988).
142. Title 45 U.S.C. § 434 specifically states that a state may continue to enforce
a law when there is no federal regulation covering the same subject matter. Because
there is no federal compensation system for parties injured in train accidents, a strong
argument can be made that state tort law should continue to impose liability when a
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol58/iss2/3
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The Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 288C cautions, "Compliance
with a legislative enactment or an administrative regulation does not prevent
a finding of negligence where a reasonable man would take additional
precautions."' 43 At least three courts have recognized that the Restatement

standard may affect the result in the context of railroad crossing accidents
depending on the circumstances of a particular case. 144 The American Law
Institute illustrated Section 288C with a railroad grade-crossing example. 4 5

"[C]ourts nationwide have adopted the Restatement standard in circumstances
similar to" railroad negligence cases."4 For example, many auto negligencb
cases will apply the "unusual circumstances" standard even if the driver is not
speeding. 47 When the same subject matter has been addressed by federal
regulations, a strong argument can be made against pre-emption by citing the
Restatement standard.

B. Train Speed Pre-emption
There is a line of cases holding that federal speed regulations pre-empt
local speed ordinances.148 Negligence cases based on excessive speed have
held that pre-emption of local speed ordinances rendered any evidence of train

railroad is negligent. See Dale Haralson & Adam Levine, GradeCrossingsand Train
Speed: Preemption, TRIAL, Feb. 1991, at 18, 21.
143. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288C (1965). For examples of
appropriate application of the Restatement standard, see infra notes 162-63 and
accompanying text.
144. See Mahony v. CSX Transp., Inc., 966 F.2d 644, 646 (11th Cir. 1992), reh'g
granted,980 F.2d 1379 (11th Cir. 1992); Easterwood v. CSX Transp., Inc., 933 F.2d
1548, 1554 (1 th Cir. 1991), affd, 113 S. Ct. 1372 (1993); Karl v. Burlington N. R.R.
Co., 880 F.2d 68, 76 (8th Cir. 1989). In Karl, the court accepted the Restatement
argument and held that the district court did not err in submitting the issue of

Burlington Northern's negligence to the jury. Karl,880 F.2d at 76. In Mahony, Judge
Birch recognized the applicability of the Restatementstandard in his concurrence and
demonstrated why the standard is necessary in a hypothetical. Mahony, 966 F.2d at
646. In Easterwood,the court rejected the argument because the tain speed limits
were part of a comprehensive statute. Easterwood, 933 F.2d at 1554. For the
arguments for and against pre-emption in Easterwood, see notes 164-74 and
accompanying text.
145. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288C cmt. a, illus. 1 (1965).
146. Karl, 880 F.2d at 76.
147. See MO. APPROVED JURY INSTRUCTIONS 17.03 (1991).
148. Easterwood,113 S.Ct. 1732, 1743-44(1993); Mahony v. CSX Transp., Inc.,
966 F.2d 644 (11th Cir.), reh'ggranted, 980 F.2d 1379 (11th Cir. 1992); Burlington
N. R.R. Co. v. Montana, 880 F.2d 1104, 1105 (9th Cir. 1989); Burlington N. R.R. Co.
v. Minnesota, 882 F.2d 1349, 1353 (8th Cir. 1989).
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speed inadmissible for the purpose of showing negligence.' The decisions
finding pre-emption of tort claims based on train speed are not totally
supported by the federal regulations they cite as authority. 50 Track speed

regulations established by the FRA set maximum operating speeds for

different classes of tracks. 5 ' Determinations of track classification consider
only objective, invariable track conditions such as ballast, cross ties, rail
conditions and tie plates.'52 Track classification determines the maximum
permissible speed for a locomotive traveling on that track.'53
The FRA recognized in the preface to its speed regulations enacted
pursuant to the FRSA that track classification does not take into account the
many factors affecting the safety of grade crossings."5 The preface states:
"The requirements prescribed in this part apply to specific track conditions
existing in isolation. Therefore, a combination of track conditions, none of
which individually amounts to a deviation of the requirements of this part,
may require remedial action to provide for safe operations over that
track." 155
Despite the express disclaimer in the preface to Section 2,13, the Supreme
Court, in CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Easterwood,'5 6 nevertheless determined that the speed limits of Section 213.9(a) were set with safety concerns
in mind. 5 ' The Court arrived at this conclusion by citing several reports
that noted that the conduct of the driver, and not the train, is the major
The Court, based on these reports,
variable in grade-crossing accidents.'

149. See Mahony, 966 F.2d at 645.
150. See 49 C.F.R. § 213 (1991); see also Haralson & Levine, supra note 142,
at 24. In order to find pre-emption of the common-law excessive speed claim, the
Supreme Court, in Easterwood,could not point to a single regulation that pre-empted
state law, but instead invoked several related safety regulations to conclude preemption was intended. Easterwood, 113 S. Ct. 1732, 1742-43.
151. 49 C.F.R. § 213.9 (1991).
152. See id § 213.
153. Id § 213.9.
154. Id § 213.1.
155. Id
156. 113 S. Ct. 1732 (1993).
157. Id at 1742-43.
158. Id; see id at n.14 (quoting U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., RAILROAD-HIGHvAY
SAFETY, PART I: A COMPREHENSIVE STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM (1971) ('Nearly
all grade crossing accidents can be said to be attributable to some degree of 'driver
error.' Thus, any effective program for improving [crossing] safety should be oriented
around the driver and his needs in approaching, traversing, and leaving the crossing
site as safely and efficiently as possible"); see also U.S. DEP'T OF TRANsP., FEDERAL

HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION, RAIL-HIGHWAY CROSSINGS STUDY 8-1 (1989) ("the most
influential predictors of train vehicle accidents at rail-highway crossings are [the] type
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol58/iss2/3

18

19931

Rogers: Rogers: Federal Pre-Emption
PRE-EMPTIONAND THE FRSA

determined that train speed only had a minor effect on safety concerns and
what effect train speed did have, was addressed in Section 213.9(a).159 Two
Justices, however, were not able to make the necessary leap in logic to find
pre-emption of train speed. The dissent stated, "Speed limits based solely on
track characteristics, .

.

. cannot be fairly described as 'substantially

subsum[ing] the subject matter of... state law' regulating speed as a factor
in grade crossing safety."'"
The federal regulations do not factor local safety hazards into permissible
Operating a train within the maximum possible track
speeds for a track.'
speed may constitute lack of due care depending on the particular local safety
hazards at a specific crossing. For example, a railroad track that runs by an
elementary school playground should be required to slow down to the local
speed ordinance. Likewise, a train should be liable in tort if it causes an
accident because it failed to slow down when there is low visibility due to
heavy fog.' 62 Allowing trains to barrel ahead at the maximum federal speed
limit in the face of conditions such as these is unconscionable. 63 Courts
must recognize that track classification determines speed maximums under a
general classification of conditions and does not take into consideration local
conditions that could endanger both the general public and railroad personnel.

The argument that federal speed regulations do not take into account local
conditions was rejected by the Eleventh Circuit in Easterwood v. CSX
Transportation,Inc.'64 The appellant, Easterwood, argued that pre-emption

was inappropriate because the speed limits were not adopted in order to

of warning devices installed, highway traffic volumes, and train volumes. Less
influential, but sometimes significant [is] maximum train speed .... ).
159. In arriving at this conclusion the Court ignored the Secretary's own
explanation of the train speed regulations he promulgated. "When the Secretary
promulgated his speed regulation in conjunction with a set of track safety standards,
he declined to consider 'variable factors such as population density near the track'
because these matters fell 'beyond the scope of the notice of proposed rule making."'
Easterwood,113 S. C. at 1744 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting 36 Fed. Reg. 20336
(1971)).
160. Easterwood,113 S. Ct. 1732, 1744 (1993) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice
Thomas concluded: "Because the Secretary has not even considered how train speed
affects crossing safety, much less 'adopted a rule, regulation, order or standard
covering [that] subject matter,' Georgia remains free to 'continue in force any law'
regulating train speed for this purpose." Id at 1745 (quoting 45 U.S.C. § 434 (1988)).
161. Id.
162. See Mahony v. CSX Transp., Inc., 966 F.2d 644, 646 (11th Cir.), reh'g
granted, 980 F.2d 1379 (11th Cir. 1992).
163. Presumably, claims such as these would not be pre-empted under the
Supreme Court's holding in Easterwood. See Easterwood, 113 S. Ct. at 1743 n.15.
164. 933 F.2d 1548, 1553 (11th Cir. 1991), aff'd, 113 S. Ct. 1372 (1993).
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minimize the number of grade crossing accidents. 6 Easterwood pointed
out that the various speed limits found in Section 213.9 are related to the class
.of track and the curve of the track.'" The sections of track are classified
on the basis of several factors including the track ballast 7 and the number
and quality of the cross ties. 6 Easterwood pointed to these factors and
argued that the speed limits are not related to the density of the surrounding
population.169 Easterwood argued that the speed limits were adopted to
prevent derailments and not to prevent grade crossing accidents. 7 The
court rejected this analysis and stated that this interpretation is just a guess at
Congress' motive for enactment of the speed regulations.' 7 ' The court cited
Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul,72 which held that it is
irrelevant to pre-emption analysis whether the state law's objectives are similar
to or different from the federal law's objectives. 73 Instead, pre-emption
analysis turns on Congress' intent to pre-empt state law and on the nature of
the federal regulation." The Supreme Court was in accord, noting that
Section 434 does not "call for an inquiry into the Secretary's purposes, but
instead directs the courts to determine whether regulations
have been adopted
75
which in fact cover the subject matter of train speed."'
In ruling that the speed regulations promulgated pursuant to the FRSA
pre-empt, in a wholesale manner, any claim that a railroad company was
negligent for operating its train at ari excessive speed, a court fails to consider
the "local safety exception" of the FRSA, Section 434.176 It also fails to
consider the FRA's acknowledgment that local conditions and circumstances
177
would require remedial regulations to provide for safe railroad operation.
A plaintiff should be able to assert that a train was negligent for failing to
slow down because, under the circumstances, a reasonably prudent train
operator would have exercised additional caution. Pre-emption of local speed
regulations goes far beyond adherence to the Supremacy Clause. Application
of the doctrine of pre-emption in this area effectively insulates a railroad from

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Id.
Id; see 49 C.F.R. § 213.57 (1991).
49 C.F.R. § 213.103 (1991).
Id §§ 109, 113.
Easterwood,933 F.2d at 1554.
Id

Id
373 U.S. 132 (1963).
Id at 142.
Easterwood,933 F.2d at 1554.
Easterwood,113 S.Ct. at 1743. But see id.
at 1745 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
45 U.S.C. § 434 (1988).
49 C.F.R. § 213.1 (1991).
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tort liability for excessive speed as long as the railroad stays within the federal
speed limits, regardless of the local conditions. 78
C. Grade Crossing Warning Devices'79
Any grade crossing can be characterized as a local safety hazard under
the exception contained in Section 434 of the FRSA. 80 Many of the
numerous factors that affect the safety of a grade crossing are particular to its
location, and some even particular to that location at a given point in time.
The multiplicity of possible factors affecting the safety of a crossing makes
nationally uniform safety standards for crossings infeasible. 8 '
Railroads should have a duty of reasonable care when installing and
maintaining grade crossing warning devices, and when operating their
trains.'82 Thus, a railroad should have a common law duty to provide
adequate, warning when approaching a grade crossing.'83 Whether this
necessitates automatic warning devices, simply a cross buck, or some other
device depends on the number and nature of the factors creating the hazard at
the crossing.'
In most cases this should be a question of fact for the
5

jury.
A court may continue to impose a common law duty on railroads to
maintain a safe crossing-even after local authorities have determined what

178. Justice Thomas' interpretation of the Secretary's regulations regarding train
speed expresses the correct view of pre-emption: "I would follow the most natural
reading of the Secretary's regulations: the Federal Government has chosen neither to
regulate train speed as a factor affecting grade crossing safety nor to prevent States
from doing so. The Court's contrary view of these regulations' pre-emptive effect
may well create a jurisdictional gap in which States lack the power to patrol the
potentially hazardous operation of trains at speeds below the applicable federal limit."
Easterwood, 113 S.Ct. at 1745 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
179. The Supreme Court recently addressed the issue of federal pre-emption of
required warning devices at grade crossings in Easterwood. 113 S. Ct. at 1738-42.
The Court concluded that Easterwood's grade-crossing claim was not pre-empted under
the facts of that case. Id at 1742. However, the Court did indicate that under an
appropriate set of facts pre-emption will be found. Id 1740-41. Thus, determining
whether federal regulations pre-empt local grade-crossing ordinances is a fact specific
analysis and the result will depend on what federal regulations are applicable to a
certain fact pattern.
180. 45 U.S.C. § 434 (1988); see also Haralson & Levine, supra note 142, at 21.
181. Haralson & Levine, supra note 142, at 21.
182. Id
183. Id
184. Id
185. Id
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safety measures are needed at a crossing-without violating the dictates of the
FRSA.' 8 6 Although the FRSA envisioned "nationally uniform standards to

the extent practicable,"'87 such uniformity is not possible with grade
crossings due to the varying local conditions that make a uniform standard
unworkable.' 88 According to one article, "Population growth, neighborhood
development, increases in traffic patterns or any of a number of factors may
render inadequate what was once a suitable warning device at a grade
crossing. Imposing a continuing duty on railroads to improve these warnings
or to provide some other form of adequate warning is the best way to protect
motorists from grade-crossing dangers.' 89
D. Applying the Above Analysis to Walker
When the reasoning advocated above is applied to Walker v. St. LouisSouthwestern Railway, it becomes apparent that several additional factors need
to be considered. First, in regard to grade-crossing warning devices, the court
correctly chose to apply the contingent pre-emption analysis announced in
Marshall. Before the court finds pre-emption of state tort law, however, it
must make certain that the factors that influenced the local agency's
determination have not radically changed. If the conditions at the crossing
have substantially changed, thus rendering the warning devices at the crossing
inadequate, pre-emption should not be found. Railroads should not be totally
insulated from tort liability by blindly complying with the local agency's
determination. The railroad should have a continuing duty to monitor the
safety of a crossing and its warning devices in order to protect the public and
train crews. The Walker court correctly found pre-emption on the issue of the
adequacy of grade-crossing warning devices if the conditions at Randall's
Crossing did not radically change between the time the MDOT made its
determination of the required crossing protection and the time of the accident.
Courts should be wary of finding pre-emption on the issue of train speed.
First, if the circumstances of the accident suggest the railroad was negligent
by operating at a given speed, even if the speed is below the maximum set by

the federal regulations, the issue should not be pre-empted by the federal
regulations."9 Second, courts need to give effect to the "local safety
exception" contained in Section 434 of the FRSA. 9' After reviewing the
relevant case law, many individual localities might think they do not have the

186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

Id at 23.
45 U.S.C. § 434 (1988).
Haralson & Levine, supra note 142, at 23.
Id
See supra part V.B.
45 U.S.C. § 434 (1988).
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authority to promulgate speed limits for railroads. Courts need to recognize
that localities have this power. If this is not recognized, a court will be
ignoring the intent of Congress and the FRA.' 92
It is likely that the court reached the correct decision in Walker. If the
factors outlined above are not considered in the future, however, the courts
will allow the railroad industry to misuse the FRSA to effectively insulate
railroads from liability when they are in fact negligent. Using the FRSA for
this purpose is repugnant to the intent of Congress and the American system

of justice.
VI. CONCLUSION
In general, courts should approach federal pre-emption of state tort law
cautiously. When the federal regulation can be nationally uniform because

varying local conditions and circumstances have no effect on the regulation,
pre-emption should be routinely found. Courts should be wary, however, of
finding pre-emption when varying local conditions make it impracticable to

have a uniform standard.
The Supreme Court's decision in Easterwood should be interpreted
narrowly in regard to train speed pre-emption. The Court merely found that
Easterwood's claim that the train was traveling too fast given the "time and
place" was pre-empted by federal speed regulations. 93 The Court expressly
stated that the decision does not bar a claim for a related tort law duty,
"such as the duty to slow or stop a train to avoid a specific, individual
hazard."1 Thus, if local conditions or circumstances suggest a reasonable
train operator should slow the train below the federal speed limits, he should
be required to do so. If the train operator acts negligently in the face of
dangerous conditions, the railroad should be liable, and the Easterwood
decision does not bar such a claim.
When courts apply a contingent pre-emption analysis to grade crossing
warning devices, they should make sure that the factors that went into the
local agency's determination have not radically changed. A railroad should
not be completely insulated from liability merely because it complied with the
federal regulations. The railroad should have a duty to monitor its grade
crossings to make sure changing conditions do not make the present warning

192. See idt; 49 C.F.1. § 213.1 (1991).
193. Easterwood,113 S. Ct. at 1743 n.15.

194. Id
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devices inadequate. When a court fails to recognize this duty, it ignores the
local safety exception contained in Section 434 of the FRSA. Furthermore,
a court does not fulfill its responsibility to the public to compensate injured
parties for their losses.
JoHN WOODSON ROGERS
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